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The recent plague of white-collar scandals has shed light on the 
ugly phenomenon that many of the most trusted names in Corporate 
America have not been playing fair.  Although the Enron and 
WorldCom collapses have captured most of the media spotlight, 
countless other corporations are currently under investigation.1  
While Americans were wary of corporate power before these 
scandals,2 such headlines have further ingrained a strong distrust for 
corporate leadership into the collective American psyche.3  For better 
or for worse, however, large corporations constitute the backbone of 
the nation’s economy,4 and workers, investors, and consumers alike 
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 1 Taking into consideration the activities of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) alone, some have suggested that “based on recent history, 
approximately 30% of listed companies will be contacted by the SEC Division of 
Enforcement sometime in the next two years.”  Association of Corporate Counsel, 
SEC Investigations, available at http://www.acca.com/networks/webcast/ 
sec_investigation.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). 
 2 See Aaron Bernstein, Too Much Corporate Power?, BUS. WK., Sept. 11, 2000, at 
144.  Poll results released on August 31, 2000, long before the Enron, WorldCom, 
and similar scandals broke, suggested that “nearly three-quarters of Americans 
believe that business has gained too much power.”  Id. 
 3 See John Gibeaut, Softening Up Client ‘Appeal’: Some Corporations Need to Put on a 
Human Face When Coming Before a Jury, 89 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (2003) (noting that “in an 
Enron-inspired climate, it’s almost a yawner when each new poll shows that distrust 
for corporate America has reached an all-time high.”).  Id. 
 4 See Charles Gray, Corporate Goliaths: Sizing Up Corporations and Governments, 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 1, 1999, at 26. 
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suffer when corporate insiders manipulate the system.5  Our nation’s 
political leaders, despite their seemingly all-too-cozy relationships 
with many of those responsible for such transgressions,6 have now 
finally decided that measures must be taken to combat the cauldron 
of white-collar crime brewing within America’s corporations.7  While 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act8 constitutes a laudable first 
effort, many are dubious that this law will significantly limit corporate 
malfeasance.9  This Comment advocates that the selective waiver 
doctrine10 serves to complement recent attempts to rein in such 
criminal activity, for it aligns corporations’ interests in maintaining 
crime-free operations and the government’s interest in ensuring that 
 
 5 Greenhouse Emitters Act on Climate Change, ENERGY, June 22, 2003, at 21 
(observing that “[r]ecent corporate scandals point to the high price paid by 
everyone . . . for inadequate corporate governance practices.”) (quoting Mindy 
Lubber, Executive Director of Ceres, Press Statement, July 9, 2003). 
 6 See, e.g., Editorial Desk, Governor Rowland Should Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2004, at A18 (noting the Connecticut Governor’s admission to taking bribes from 
local businessmen to secure favorable government contracts); William M. Welch, 
Democrats Begin Fight to Replace Torricelli, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 2, 2002, at 14A (noting 
accusations that the New Jersey Senator took bribes from a businessman in exchange 
for his potential influence in business dealings). 
 7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 8 Id.  While meant to serve many ends, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is generally 
intended to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of [public] 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”  
Id.  The SEC had proposed a rule permitting selective waiver as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, but later withdrew that proposal.  See Implementation of Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter Implementation]. 
 9 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 
(2002) (observing that “[t]he Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the revised NYSE listing 
guidelines may represent only modest and possibly insufficient steps to improve 
corporate governance more generally.”).  Id. at 901. 
 10 Selective waiver is also often referred to as “limited waiver,” especially in older 
works.  See, e.g., Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-
Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789, 823 (1984).  The term limited waiver, 
however, “refers to two distinct types of waivers: selective and partial.”  Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991).  
“Selective waiver permits the client who has disclosed privileged communications to 
one party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties. Partial waiver 
permits a client who has disclosed a portion of privileged communications to 
continue asserting the privilege as to the remaining portions of the same 
communications.”  Id. (citing Breckinridge L. Willcox, Martin Marietta and Erosion of 
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Protection, 49 MD. L. REV. 917, 922 
(1990); Developments in the Law – Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 
1630-31 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]).  This Comment will use the 
term selective waiver except when quoting a source. 
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applicable laws are followed. 
A corporation that suspects criminal wrongdoing within its ranks 
inevitably faces a difficult decision.11  It can hire outside counsel to 
conduct an internal investigation into the matter, and subsequently 
disclose any relevant findings to the appropriate government 
agency.12 Alternatively, the corporation may elect to make no 
disclosures whatsoever.13  Full disclosure benefits the public at large, 
because, among other advantages, it enables the government to take 
steps to cure whatever malfeasance has occurred.14  Since criminal 
liability can attach to the corporation itself for the acts of its agents,15 
however, the corporation may have much to lose from admitting its 
own guilt.  Therefore, in order to induce corporations to disclose 
evidence of criminal activity, government agencies typically offer 
more lenient punishments than would otherwise be imposed.16 
Because corporate misconduct often not only violates criminal 
laws, but injures third parties as well, it may give rise to significant 
civil liability.17  In most jurisdictions, a corporation’s disclosure of 
sensitive materials to a government agency constitutes a complete 
waiver of the otherwise applicable privileges.18 A corporation’s initial 
 
 11 Nancy Horton Burke, The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible Waiver 
of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 34 (1997). 
 12 Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of Privilege Viable? 
Counsel Face Hobson’s Choice When Asked to Cooperate With Government, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 
2003, at 7. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.  The court noted, “[w]e do not question the 
importance of the public interest in voluntary cooperation with government 
investigations.”  Id. 
 15 New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-93 
(1909) (recognizing that a corporation can be held criminally liable for the criminal 
conduct of its agents, where such illegal acts are committed within an agent’s scope 
of employment). 
 16 See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7; See also Internal Corporate 
Investigations: The Dilemma Presented in Considering Whether to Share Investigation Results 
with the SEC or the Justice Department, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1170 (July 14, 
2003) (noting that “corporate cooperation, disclosure of the complete results of [a 
corporate] internal investigation, and a willingness to waive attorney-client and work-
product protection [are] factors which a prosecutor could consider in determining 
whether to charge a corporation.”); Department of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy, 
(Aug. 10, 1993) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf. 
 17 See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. 
 18 See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 
1997); Genentech Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d 
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disclosure of otherwise privileged materials to the government, 
according to most courts, waives those privileges as to all other 
parties; thus, civil litigants seeking to sue the corporation will typically 
be granted unfettered access to the disclosed materials.19  Even 
confidentiality arrangements between the disclosing corporation and 
the government agency are seldom sufficient to permit the successful 
assertion of privilege against a civil plaintiff if a previous disclosure 
was made.20  Thus, a corporation’s initial disclosure to the 
government provides non-government civil litigants with damaging 
evidence that can be used against the corporation in a suit for 
damages.21  In essence, disclosures to government agencies equip 
private litigants with “a virtual road map to assist them in their 
lawsuit.”22  Given that the benefits to be derived from lenient criminal 
punishment are often insignificant when compared to the potential 
civil liability at stake, corporations aware of their own improprieties 
often decline to make any disclosures to the government.23 
The selective waiver doctrine encourages corporate cooperation 
with government investigations, by permitting corporations to retain 
applicable privileges in subsequent private litigation despite initial 
disclosures to the government.24  Facilitating disclosure allows law 
enforcement agencies to levy criminal penalties against the individual 
perpetrators of the harm, as well as the corporation itself.25  In 
addition, selective waiver reduces the costs associated with 
investigating criminal activity,26 and encourages corporations to 
 
Cir. 1991); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian Corp. 
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (all suggesting or concluding that a 
waiver of privileges to one party is typically a waiver to all parties). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 (finding a complete waiver despite a 
confidentiality agreement to the contrary between the disclosing corporation and a 
government agency).  But see In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 
1993) (holding that in certain situations, a confidentiality agreement could prevent 
the complete waiver of all privileges despite an initial disclosure to a government 
agency). 
 21 See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See David M. Greenwald & Matthew J. Thomas, Selective Waiver of Privileges, FOR 
THE DEFENSE, Dec. 2002, at 10-11. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. 
 26 See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303.  The Sixth Circuit, despite its eventual 
rejection of the doctrine, observed that “[t]here is considerable appeal, and 
justification, for permitting selective waiver . . . . Considerable savings are realized to 
the [g]overnment, and through it to the public, in time and fiscal expenditure 
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enhance their internal compliance efforts, thereby preventing future 
misconduct.27 
Despite these apparent advantages, selective waiver has been 
repeatedly condemned by both courts and commentators alike.28  
Only one federal circuit has adopted the doctrine,29 and only in 
limited form.30  The doctrine’s critics charge that selective waiver 
places private litigants at a distinct disadvantage,31 and that the ends 
served by selective waiver, although laudable, are inconsistent with 
the goals of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
protection.32 
This Comment argues that permitting a corporation to waive 
privileges as to the government, yet retain them against other private 
litigants, rarely serves to disadvantage private litigants.33  
Furthermore, this Comment demonstrates that the general policies 
supporting  existing privileges, and the benefits that could be derived 
 
related to the investigation of crimes and civil fraud.”  Id. 
 27 See id.  The court further noted, “[s]uch a policy might also . . . increase the 
likelihood that corporations would engage in . . . self-policing . . . .” Id; see also Daniel 
L. Goelzer & Clifford E. Kirsch, The Doctrine of Selective Waiver or Self Destruction?, 6 NO. 
8 INSIGHTS 11, 14 (1992); Janet L. Hall, Note, “Limited Waiver” of Protection Afforded by 
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 981, 996 
(1993). 
 28 See cases cited supra note 18.  See also Dorris, supra note 10, at 823; Jill A. 
Hornstein, Comment, Paying the “Traditional Price” of Disclosure: The Third Circuit 
Rejects Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 467, 479-80 
(1993); Alec Koch, Note, Internal Corporate Investigations: The Waiver of Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work-Product Protection Through Voluntary Disclosures to the Government, 34 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 347, 374 (1997); Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: 
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1228 (1982) [hereinafter Rabbit]. 
 29 See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(en banc) (recognizing selective waiver with regard to the attorney-client privilege). 
 30 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. EEOC, 922 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 
(rejecting selective waiver’s applicability to the work-product protection); see also infra 
notes 140, 277. 
 31 See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1222 (positing that “[i]t is apparent that [selective 
waiver] would enable litigants to pick and choose among [its opponents] . . . .  [A] 
litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain genuine confidentiality.”); 
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1218-19 (arguing that “[w]ithin the limits of legislative 
authorization, the judicial system should not discriminate between private parties 
and government agencies; justice demands that all litigants be treated by the same 
rules.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425-29 (observing that the goals of selective 
waiver are inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege 
and work-product protection).   
 33 See infra notes 230-247 and accompanying text. 
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from a selective waiver rule, invite widespread recognition of this 
doctrine in the form of a new corporation-government privilege.34 
This Comment advocates the adoption of a modified selective 
waiver doctrine.35  Part I of this Comment addresses the purposes of 
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product protection, and 
their relevance in the corporate context.  Part II examines the 
current state of the selective waiver doctrine, and courts’ analyses of 
its prospects and pitfalls.  Part III explores the policy arguments 
surrounding adoption or rejection of the doctrine, the 
recommended scope of the privilege, and how it can reasonably be 
implemented.  Finally, Part IV concludes that Congress should 
implement a selective waiver rule in the form of a new corporation-
government privilege, as such a policy would help to align corporate 
and government interests, and, in the long run, reduce criminal 
activity within American corporations. 
I. Background 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between 
attorney and client from discovery.36  It is the oldest of all the 
testimonial privileges, arising in Elizabethan times.37  The privilege is 
intended to “encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”38  
Without the privilege, a “client would be reluctant to confide in his 
lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal 
 
 34 See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.  Just as the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protection provide real, although generally 
unquantifiable benefits, this Comment contends that a new corporation-government 
privilege would provide significant, although similarly unquantifiable benefits, at 
limited costs.  Id. 
 35 See id.  Diversified held selective waiver to be applicable generally, that is, even 
in the absence of a confidentiality agreement with the investigating government 
agency.  Diversified, 572 F.2d at 599-600.  This Comment advocates that selective 
waiver should only be applicable in cases where an agreement concerning the 
confidentiality of the materials disclosed is reached between the disclosing 
corporation and the government agency.  See infra notes 349-350 and accompanying 
text. 
 36 See EDNA SALAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 2 (4th ed. 2001). 
 37 See id. 
 38 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
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advice.”39  While originally a judicial creation,40 the attorney-client 
privilege has been codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.41 
By its nature, the attorney-client privilege inhibits the truth 
finding process,42 and therefore courts strive to confine the privilege 
to its “narrowest possible limits” while still maintaining its purpose.43  
The attorney-client privilege, like all privileges, serves as an exception 
to the general rule that the public “has a right to every man’s 
evidence.”44  The attorney-client privilege itself has been often 
criticized because its burdens (restricted availability of evidence and 
increased discovery costs) are said to be “plain and concrete” while its 
benefits (promoting the accessibility to informed legal advice) have 
been referred to as “indirect and speculative.”45  Although the 
advantages of the privilege are admittedly unquantifiable, the 
attorney-client privilege has nevertheless become a cornerstone of 
the Anglo-American legal system, referred to as one of the “bastions 
of an ordered liberty.”46 
Because of this narrow interpretation, the attorney-client 
privilege is extremely fragile and can be lost through purposeful or 
inadvertent disclosure of otherwise privileged information to other 
parties.47  Since confidentiality is a fundamental element of the 
attorney-client privilege, a confidentiality breach is typically deemed a 
waiver of the privilege, and therefore the protections it affords are 
lost.48  “The waiver rule serves to ensure that the privilege, with its 
attendant costs to the judicial system, is ‘strictly confined . . . .’”49  
Virtually any disclosure to others constitutes a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege,50 except when the party to whom the information is 
disclosed shares a common interest in the litigation with the 
 
 39 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 40 See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 42 See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). 
 43 In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 
40, § 2291). 
 44 WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2192. 
 45 NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291). 
 46 See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 2. 
 47 See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 292-391. 
 48 See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 91, at 187-88 (Cleary ed. 1972). 
 49 Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1207 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291). 
 50 See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1989).  The 
common interest exception protects communications disclosed to another party 
sharing a common interest with the party asserting the privilege.  Id. 
  




Courts seek to ensure “fairness” to all interested parties, in that 
when a certain point of disclosure is reached, or when disclosures are 
made to certain parties but not others, “fairness requires that [the 
attorney-client] privilege shall cease whether . . . that result [was 
intended] or not.”52  Many contend that such “limited” disclosures53 
transforms the privilege from a “shield” to a “sword,” such that the 
privilege becomes an offensive “brush on the attorney’s palette,”54 
instead of a defensive mechanism to protect confidential 
communications.55  In essence, a client cannot assert the attorney-
client privilege over certain communications in one context, while 
not maintaining the confidentiality of those communications in 
others.56 
Although courts seek to restrict the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege to its “narrowest possible limits,”57 permitting a “selective 
waiver” in limited circumstances may help achieve valuable public 
policy goals.58  Dismissing the potential benefits that could be 
garnered by permitting selective waiver of the attorney-client 
 
 51 See In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 441 n.9 (6th Cir. 1997).  The court 
observed, “under normal circumstances, waiver as to one party should be waiver as to 
all.”  Id. 
 52 WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291. 
 53 The “fairness” argument has been summed up as follows: 
Generally, the fairness argument has been applied in the form of the 
‘subject matter’ waiver rule: once a client has disclosed part of a 
privileged communication, the privilege is deemed waived as to all 
related communications.  To allow clients to choose to reveal only 
certain parts of a communication—presumably, those parts most 
favorable to their cause—would be to convert the privilege from a 
‘shield’ to a ‘sword’. . . to paint a ‘misleadingly one-sided’ picture of 
the facts. 
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1208 (internal citations omitted). 
 54 Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306-07.  The Sixth Circuit similarly held that a 
party’s disclosure of privileged materials to a government agency, but not to other 
parties, resulted in an offensive, or sword-like use of the privilege, as opposed to the 
intended defensive, shield-like use of the privilege. Id. 
 55 See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 
638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 56 See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 57 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291). 
 58 See infra Part III.  Part III discusses the various public policy aims that would be 
advanced by embracing the selective waiver doctrine.  See also Hall, supra note 27, at 
994-1000 (advocating an adoption of selective waiver and discussing its benefits); 
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1223-25 (discussing the arguments in favor of selective 
waiver, but ultimately rejecting its application). 
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privilege, merely because they do not readily lend themselves to 
demonstration by empirical analysis, would invite a complete 
abandonment of the privilege itself, as its benefits are only 
“speculative.”  In addition, confining the waiver doctrine within its 
traditional boundaries, and thereby refusing to consider viable 
alternatives entailing substantial societal gains, makes the law 
stagnant and unresponsive to the nature of the modern world.59 
B. The Work-Product Protection 
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product protection 
arises from the assumption that an attorney cannot provide full and 
frank advice to his client, and likewise cannot effectively represent his 
client, without the expectation that sensitive and potentially 
damaging information will be kept from his client’s adversaries.60  
First recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1947,61 the 
protection has since been codified within the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.62  Just as the attorney-client privilege has become an 
accepted aspect of the American legal system, so too has the work-
product protection.63 
The work-product doctrine generally protects “documents and 
tangible things, prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, by 
or for another party, or by or for that other party’s representative.”64  
Because it protects an attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories,”65 the work-product doctrine has been 
recognized as necessary to maintain the proper operation of the 
adversarial system.66  This “privilege,”67 although broader in scope 
than the attorney-client privilege,68 is unlike the attorney-client 
privilege in that it is not absolute.69  The work-product doctrine 
 
 59 See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text (discussing the uniqueness of the 
corporation, and its reliance upon its agents for its survival). 
 60 See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 477. 
 61 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). 
 62 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 63 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 36. 
 64 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 65 Id. 
 66 John E. Tyler III, Analyzing New Protections For Intangible Work Product and 
Harmonizing That Protection with the Use of Privilege Logs, 64 UMKC L. REV. 743, 757 
(1996). 
 67 See infra note 70. 
 68 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975). 
 69 See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 549. 
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affords parties only a “qualified” protection, where certain materials 
deemed work product may indeed be discoverable by an opposing 
party.70  Opinion work product, work product containing an 
attorney’s opinions, mental impressions, strategies, etc., is virtually 
never discoverable.71 Conversely, fact work product, encompassing 
“all other work product,”72 is discoverable upon a showing of 
substantial need and undue hardship.73  The work-product doctrine 
embodies the collective understanding that adequate representation 
can only be achieved when an attorney is free to prepare for litigation 
without the specter of discovery looming over every word the attorney 
chooses to memorialize.74 
Waiver of the work-product protection is treated similarly to 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.75  While waiver of the work-
product protection may not always occur by virtue of a disclosure to a 
third-party, waiver will typically occur when a disclosure is made to a 
party deemed to be an adversary.76  Once waiver occurs, parties in 
subsequent litigation are permitted to discover materials that would 
otherwise be protected if the waiver had not occurred.77  The 
common interest exception also applies to the waiver of the work-
product doctrine, in that the disclosure of privileged materials to a 
party sharing a common interest with the party seeking the 
 
 70 See id. at 478.  As observed by Professor Epstein, “[t]he words ‘doctrine,’ 
‘immunity,’ and privilege (among others) have been used in naming the protection 
given work product.  Some resist the use of the term ‘privilege’ [when describing the 
work-product doctrine] because the protection is qualified, unlike the traditional 
communications privileges.”  Id.  See also Charles W. Ehrhardt & Matthew D. Shultz, 
Pulling Skeletons from the Closet: A Look into the Work-Product Doctrine as Applied to Expert 
Witnesses, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 90 n.104 (2003) (observing that “[a]lthough 
work-product protection is often referred to as a privilege, it is in fact a qualified 
immunity from disclosure rather than a statutory privilege such as the attorney-client 
privilege.”). 
 71 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.  The Supreme Court determined, “such work 
product [i.e., an attorney’s opinions and mental impressions] cannot be disclosed 
simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent 
without undue hardship.”  Id. 
 72 Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 644 n.5 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 74 See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 477. 
 75 See id. at 478. 
 76 See Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 234-35.  The work-product disclosure to the SEC was 
deemed to be a waiver as the SEC was held to stand in an adversarial position to the 
disclosing party.  Id.  Determining whether or not such a disclosure should constitute 
a full waiver, such that other parties may have access to the disclosed materials, lies at 
the crux of this Comment. 
 77 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11. 
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protection will not constitute a waiver.78 
Since the work-product protection also impedes the truth-
finding process, courts have been apt to find waiver of the protection 
even in cases of inadvertent disclosure, and seek to construe the 
work-product doctrine narrowly.79  The primary benefit of the work-
product doctrine, preserving the integrity of the adversarial system,80 
has been correspondingly criticized as speculative and amorphous.81  
The question thus becomes whether expanding the narrow scope of 
the work-product doctrine, by permitting a selective waiver of the 
work-product protection, is justified when there is a realistic prospect 
of advancing certain valued public policy aims. 
C. The Nature of the Corporation and Privilege 
While corporations are considered legal “persons” in their own 
right, this is merely a legal fiction.82  Corporations are unable to act 
on their own behalf, and instead they must rely upon their agents 
and employees.83  Unlike individuals, corporations lack states of 
mind, and therefore “they cannot simply choose to obey the law.”84  
Rather, corporations, particularly larger ones, “must implement 
programs that encourage legal compliance among their agents” 85 and 
conduct internal investigations to determine whether their agents 
 
 78 See United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  In AT&T, 
both the government and MCI brought suit against AT&T on identical anti-trust 
grounds.  Id.  MCI turned over certain confidential documents to the government to 
assist in the litigation.  Id.  AT&T sought to acquire those documents in discovery, 
arguing that MCI had waived its work-product protection over them by virtue of 
disclosure to the government.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit, rejecting AT&T’s contention 
that waiver had occurred, held that “[a] disclosure made in the pursuit of such 
[common] trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against 
opponents, should be allowed without waiver of the privilege.”  Id. at 1299.  See also, 
Hall, supra note 27, at 988 (recognizing “work-product might be disclosed to a 
nonadversary third party without undermining the purpose of the doctrine because 
the disclosure still preserves the integrity of the adversarial process.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Suggs v. Whitaker, 152 F.R.D. 501, 505 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that 
“[b]ecause work-product protection by its nature may hinder an investigation into 
the true facts, it should be narrowly construed consistent with its purpose.”). 
 80 See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 477. 
 81 See Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a 
New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L. REV. 385, 452 (1994). 
 82 See Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932). 
 83 New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 493. 
 84 John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance 
Audits, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 621 (1995). 
 85 Id. 
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have committed unlawful acts. 
If a corporation suspects unlawful conduct on the part of its 
agents or employees, it will typically hire outside counsel to gather 
the facts, assess the corporation’s potential liability, and make related 
recommendations regarding how to proceed.86  These investigations 
may consist of conducting interviews with employees, reviewing 
documents, and subsequently submitting a report of the findings to 
management.87 
Such investigations raise sensitive issues regarding privilege.88  In 
Upjohn Co. v. United States,89 the Supreme Court addressed the 
difficulty of applying traditional notions of privilege to a modern, 
multi-national corporation.90  The Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), a 
large drug manufacturer,91 retained counsel to investigate allegations 
of bribery of foreign officials. In the course of that investigation, 
counsel conducted interviews with various employees thought to have 
knowledge of the circumstances.92  After being informed by counsel 
of its findings, Upjohn submitted a report to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disclosing its conclusion that certain 
payments may have been in violation of applicable law.93  The SEC 
subsequently issued a subpoena, intending to obtain documents 
revealing the communications between the interviewed employees 
and the attorneys, as well as the related interview notes and 
memoranda drafted by those attorneys.94  Rejecting the “control 
group test,” the Court held that the communications between 
counsel and corporate employees were privileged, even though the 
employees at issue were not of the “highest authority”; that is, they 
were not the decision-makers within the company.95  Furthermore, 
the Court also determined that the aforementioned notes and 
 
 86 Id. at 621-24. 
 87 See, e.g., Diversified, 572 F.2d at 599-600; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
 88 See generally, Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 13. 
 89 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 90 See generally, Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
 91 In 1995, Upjohn merged with Pharmacia AB, a Swedish pharmaceutical 
company.  Upjohn to Pfizer (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mlive.com 
/business/kgazette/special/pfizer/200330430_pfizerkz18.html.  After another 
merger in 2000, the consolidated corporation became known simply as Pharmacia 
Corp.  Id.  In 2003, Pfizer Inc. acquired Pharmacia.  Id. 
 92 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387-88. 
 93 Id. at 388. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 383-84. 
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memoranda were undiscoverable opinion work product.96 
Although Upjohn does not suggest that the Supreme Court would 
readily adopt the selective waiver doctrine if given the opportunity, 
the case does evince willingness on the part of the Court to reject the 
narrowest possible construction of privilege under certain 
circumstances.97  According to most circuit courts, a corporation that 
voluntarily discloses privileged materials to the government, in 
cooperation with a government investigation, loses the privilege over 
those materials in subsequent litigation, even if the corporation 
discloses those materials pursuant to a well-crafted confidentiality 
agreement.98  Regardless of the government’s promises that such 
materials will be kept from third-party litigants, courts typically find 
that, upon disclosing such materials to the government, applicable 
privileges are waived.99 
Today’s corporations confronted with accusations of 
wrongdoing therefore are said to face a “Hobson’s choice.”100  While 
cooperation with the government will typically result in less stringent 
punishment, such an advantage may be of relatively little importance 
if cooperation eventually leads to third-party access to incriminating 
evidence, which would be otherwise unavailable if the corporation 
refused to cooperate.101  Upjohn directly addressed the inherent 
difficulty in applying privilege to corporations, which, despite the 
legal fictions the law has created on their behalf, can only act by and 
through their agents.102  In the same vein, a reassessment of the 
benefits that could be derived from aligning corporate and 
government interests through selective waiver is in order, instead of a 
 
 96 Id. at 401. 
 97 See, e.g., Chad Bement, Note, Corporate Invention Records and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 28 J. CORP. L. 317, 323 (2003) (observing that “[i]n Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, the Supreme Court rejected the narrow control group test and considerably 
expanded the scope the attorney-client privilege with regard to corporate 
communications.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302. 
 99 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302. 
 100 Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.  Technically, the term “Hobson’s 
choice” refers not to a choice between two bad alternatives, although often used in 
such a manner, but rather a “choice between taking either that which is offered or 
nothing.”  WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 909 (1996). 
 101 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 13. 
 102 See Thomas R. Mulroy and Eric J. Muñoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. 
L.J. 49, 51 (2002). 
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mere rejection of the selective waiver under traditional waiver 
conceptions. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Rise of Selective Waiver: Diversified Industries, Inc. v. 
Meredith 
Generally, the attorney-client privilege is deemed waived to all 
parties if a privileged communication is disclosed to parties outside of 
the attorney-client relationship.103  Similarly, the protections afforded 
to work product are lost if such material is disclosed to an adversary 
or potential adversary.104  In essence, the “waiver rule” is said to 
“ensure that . . . privilege[s] ‘[are] strictly confined within the 
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of [their] 
principle[s].’”105  During the late 1970s, however, a seemingly 
progressive movement was afoot to carve out exceptions to these 
traditional constructions of waiver.106 
At the time, the SEC had instituted a formal “Voluntary 
Disclosure Program,” offering leniency in exchange for a 
corporation’s cooperation with an SEC investigation.107  Given the 
government’s lack of resources to investigate and prosecute every 
potential violation of relevant law, the program was seen as a good 
way to ensure that more illegal practices would be halted.108  Most 
notably, the documents disclosed to the SEC in Upjohn were disclosed 
pursuant to this program.109  While the Voluntary Disclosure Program 
 
 103 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Hornstein, supra note 28, at 472 (citing Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1208). 
 106 Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 10-11. 
 107 See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After 
Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 665, 668 n.12 (1983).  Instituted in 1976, the Voluntary 
Disclosure Program was primarily designed to combat bribery of foreign officials by 
American corporations who made such bribes in an effort to gain or retain business 
in those foreign nations.  See id.  The ongoing practice of bribery led to the passage 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the next year.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 
(1977); see also DONALD CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (2d 
ed. 1999). 
 108 See Judson W. Starr & Nancy Voisin, Toward an Environmental Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 333, 340 (1991). 
 109 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 388; Scott R. Flucke, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
Corporate Setting: Counsel’s Dual Role as Attorney and Executive, 62 UMKC L. REV. 549, 
554 (1994). 
  
2005 COMMENT 837 
 
 
is no longer employed in its original form,110 corporations are still 
encouraged to voluntarily disclose information regarding potential 
illegal activities in their midst, and are often punished less severely as 
a result of their cooperation.111 
Out of this climate of promoting corporate self-policing and 
voluntary disclosure arose the doctrine of selective waiver.112  In 
essence, selective waiver permits a corporation to disclose privileged 
materials to certain parties, namely government agencies, while 
retaining the privilege vis-à-vis other litigants.113  Disclosures of 
potentially illegal activities made by a corporation to a government 
agency are typically of interest to third parties that seek to sue civilly 
for injuries sustained due to such wrongdoing.114  Should such virtual 
admissions of wrongdoing be made available to third parties, the 
disclosing corporation, through its voluntary disclosure, would have 
contributed to its own eventual failure in the subsequent suit.115  As 
mentioned, the potential advantages of leniency gained through 
cooperation with the government often fail to outweigh the 
disastrous consequences that would likely be incurred if third parties 
were permitted to access the materials disclosed.116  In short, without 
selective waiver, corporations are less inclined to make any voluntary 
disclosures to the government.117 
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,118 Diversified Industries 
(“Diversified”), a corporation engaged in the business of supplying 
copper to brass manufacturers, found itself the target of a criminal 
investigation.119  As a result of a proxy fight among its shareholders, 
information came to light that Diversified may have established a 
 
 110 See Dorris, supra note 10, at 796 n.36.  Dorris notes that “[t]he SEC no longer 
employs the [V]oluntary [D]isclosure [P]rogram to obtain information on 
questionable payments [to foreign officials]; it now employs the program only to 
obtain disclosures of misrepresentations and omissions in statements submitted 
pursuant to the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.”  Id. 
 111 See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. 
 112 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id.  In certain instances, the “third party” seeking access to the disclosed 
materials is another government agency, and not a private litigant.  See, e.g., Mass. 
Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 683; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217. 
 115 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 12. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
 119 Id. at 599-600. 
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“slush fund” to pay bribes to the purchasing agents of Diversified’s 
customers.120  In exchange for agreeing to take a lower grade of 
copper than contracted for, the purchasing agents of Diversified’s 
customers were paid out of this “slush fund.”121  Diversified retained 
the services of a prominent law firm to conduct an internal 
investigation in order to determine if such charges were legitimate.122  
The law firm interviewed many of Diversified’s employees, pored 
through relevant documents, and eventually produced a 
memorandum outlining its findings to Diversified’s Board of 
Directors.123 
Unfortunately for Diversified, these allegations of corporate 
bribery attracted the attention of the SEC.124  Pursuant to its own 
official investigation, the SEC filed a subpoena requesting the 
memorandum prepared by the law firm.125  Seeking leniency, 
Diversified voluntarily turned over the memorandum and entered 
into a consent decree with the SEC.126 
Diversified’s situation, however, worsened when it was sued by 
one of its former customers, the Weatherhead Company 
(“Weatherhead”), a brass manufacturer.127  Weatherhead’s 
purchasing agents were among those allegedly bribed by Diversified, 
and as a result, Weatherhead was supplied with a low grade of 
copper, although it paid for a higher grade.128  Weatherhead alleged 
tortious interference with the contractual relationship between itself 
and Diversified, unlawful conspiracy, and anti-trust violations, and 
sought both actual and punitive damages.129  In order to support its 
allegations, Weatherhead requested the memorandum and 
contended that Diversified waived the attorney-client privilege 
through its voluntary disclosure of the memorandum to the SEC.130 
As the case was decided before Upjohn, much of the court’s 
attention was focused upon the scope of the attorney-client privilege 
 
 120 Id. at 600. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 600. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 601. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 600. 
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with respect to the control group test and not the selective waiver 
issue.131  Almost off-handedly, however, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted selective waiver, observing 
that “[t]o hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the 
developing procedure of corporations to employ independent 
outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect 
stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.”132  The 
Diversified court supported its decision to adopt selective waiver by 
recognizing that the plaintiffs were in no way prohibited from 
bringing their suit, and they were still free to obtain needed evidence 
from “non-privileged” sources.133 
Since the Eighth Circuit’s adoption of selective waiver in 1977,134 
numerous corporate defendants have sought to rely on the selective 
waiver theory, but with little success.135  The failure of selective waiver 
to gain widespread approval has caused some commentators to 
observe that the theory, as articulated in Diversified, is “essentially on 
life support.”136  The limited treatment of the doctrine by the 
Diversified court has likely contributed to the theory’s inability to gain 
much traction in other courts.137  While the corporation in Diversified 
was successful in maintaining privilege over materials disclosed to the 
SEC,138 the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of the selective waiver doctrine 
was limited to a single paragraph, provided scant precedential 
support,139 and has been widely criticized.140  The Eighth Circuit 
 
 131 Id. at 600-10. 
 132 Id. at 611. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id.  Although finding its first judicial acceptance in Diversified, selective 
waiver was first raised in court in 1973, in In re Penn. Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 
61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).  In Penn Central, an attorney for a corporation under 
investigation by the SEC, testified before an SEC hearing.  Id. at 457.  Subsequently, 
the plaintiffs in a civil action sought the transcripts of the attorney’s testimony and 
documents related thereto.  Id. at 456.  The corporation claimed that such 
documents and transcripts were protected by the attorney-client privilege under the 
selective waiver theory.  Id. at 462.  Rejecting selective waiver, the district court 
observed that “[i]t is hornbook law that the voluntary disclosure or consent to 
disclosure of a communication, otherwise subject to a claim of privilege, effectively 
waives the privilege.”  Id. at 463. 
 135 See cases cited supra note 18. 
 136 Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611. 
 139 See id.  The court cited Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F. Supp. 
1122 (D. Haw. 1969) and United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated on 
other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961), to support its adoption of selective waiver.  
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remains the only federal jurisdiction that can be said to retain 
selective waiver.141 
B. The Fall of Selective Waiver: Judicial Treatment of the Doctrine 
Since Diversified 
After Diversified, corporations readily began disclosing privileged 
materials to the government pursuant to agency investigations, 
seemingly expecting that they would still be able to assert the relevant 
privileges over such materials as to private litigants if necessary.142  As 
one commentator noted, over 425 corporations participated in the 
SEC’s Voluntary Disclosure Program in 1979 (two years after the 
Diversified decision), at a time when widespread adoption of the 
selective waiver doctrine appeared feasible.143  Indeed, in 1981 a 
district court outside the Eighth Circuit held that a showing of an 
intent to retain privilege over materials surrendered to a government 
agency would permit the privilege to subsequently attach in future 
 
Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.  Bucks County, however, dealt only with whether waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege at a suppression hearing constituted a complete waiver.  
Bucks County, 297 F. Supp. at 1123.  Likewise, Goodman concerned the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and not the attorney-client 
privilege.  Goodman, 289 F.2d at 259.  In essence, Diversified “borrowed” the analysis 
from these cases, which permitted “selective waivers” in other contexts.  See Diversified, 
572 F.2d at 611. 
 140 See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423-24 
(criticizing Diversified).  For a discussion of the scant treatment of the selective waiver 
issue by the Diversified court, see Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 684; Koch, supra note 
28, at 356; Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1211; Janice M. Symchych, Selective Waiver of 
Attorney-Client Privilege: Although a 1978 8th Circuit Case Gave Corporations Reason to Hope 
They Could Selectively Disclose Privileged and Work Product Information to the Government in 
Confidence, Recent Developments Suggest Greater Caution is in Order, 60-OCT. BENCH & B. 
MINN 17, 18 (2003). 
 141 See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611; United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 657 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (determining that privilege remained despite production of documents to 
a grand jury); McDonnell Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 243 (noting the “[a]ttorney-client 
privilege is generally waived by disclosure of . . . confidential communications to any 
third parties, except in the limited waiver situation recognized in Diversified.”).  The 
Second Circuit has suggested, however, that it would consider permitting selective 
waiver in cases where the parties enter into a valid confidentiality agreement.  See 
Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235; infra notes 184-190 and accompanying text. 
 142 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 12. 
 143 See Dorris, supra note 10, at 822.  Dorris observed that “[i]n 1979, when only 
one court had adopted the limited waiver rule, over 425 corporations had 
participated in the program.”  Id.  In 1979, no other circuit court had yet to address 
the selective waiver issue since Diversified.  Id.  It is possible that the program’s success 
in that year was attributable to the potential for selective waiver to take hold in other 
jurisdictions apart from the Eighth Circuit. 
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litigation.144  One by one, however, federal circuits began to address 
the issue of selective waiver, and looked upon the doctrine with 
disfavor.145 
In Permian Corp. v. United States,146decided in 1981, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit flatly 
rejected selective waiver with respect to the attorney-client privilege, 
finding the doctrine “wholly unpersuasive.”147  Permian concerned the 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s (“Occidental”) hostile takeover 
attempt of the Mead Corporation (“Mead”) through an exchange 
offer.148  Mead resisted the takeover and filed suits in various courts.149  
During the course of discovery, Occidental turned over millions of 
documents to Mead, but added a stipulation that any privileged 
materials turned over to Mead would not constitute a waiver of any 
applicable privilege.150  At the same time, Occidental was attempting 
to obtain SEC approval of the exchange offer’s registration 
statement, and to that end, turned over 1.2 million of its documents 
to the SEC.151  In order to expedite the registration process, the SEC 
sought access to the documents previously turned over to Mead, as 
Mead had already organized them in a manageable manner.152 
Occidental acquiesced to the SEC’s request, and instructed 
Mead to furnish the SEC with the relevant documents, pursuant to an 
agreement between Occidental and the SEC, whereby the SEC was 
forbidden from delivering the documents to any third parties.153  
 
 144 See Teachers, 521 F. Supp. at 644-45 (holding that “disclosure to the SEC should 
be deemed to be a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless the right to 
assert the privilege in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the time 
disclosure is made.”).  See also Hornstein, supra note 28, at 476 (noting that “[t]he 
Teachers decision essentially adopted the limited waiver rule articulated in Diversified 
but added a surmountable hurdle—an intent to retain the attorney-client 
privilege.”). 
 145 See cases cited supra note 18. 
 146 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 147 Id. at 1220. 
 148 Id. at 1215. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 1216. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1216. 
 153 Id. at 1216-17.  In essence, the agreement was designed to enable Occidental to 
retain its privileges over the documents in future litigation.  Id.  While some 
controversy existed as to whether the agreement between Occidental and the SEC 
amounted to an agreement to keep all of the documents confidential, this matter was 
settled by the circuit court as the court found that the agreement did, in effect, 
prevent the SEC from delivering the disclosed materials to third parties.  Id. at 1219.  
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Although Occidental eventually chose to abandon the exchange 
offer, Mead supplied the SEC with approximately 1,000 Occidental 
documents, of which seven were determined to fall within the ambit 
of the attorney-client privilege.154  Thereafter, the Department of 
Energy (“DoE”) launched an investigation of the petroleum pricing 
practices of an Occidental subsidiary, and sought the Occidental 
documents in the SEC’s possession.155  The SEC informed Occidental 
of its intention to comply with the DoE’s request, and Occidental 
asserted the attorney-client privilege over certain documents.156 
The D.C. Circuit found that Occidental had wholly waived any 
privilege to the documents at issue, and rejected the selective waiver 
doctrine outright.157  The court rebuffed Occidental’s assertions that 
the attorney-client privilege protects the documents from delivery to 
the DoE, noting “the mantle of confidentiality which once protected 
the documents [was] so irretrievably breached that an effective waiver 
of the privilege [was] accomplished.”158  The court held that a party 
cannot rationally assert the attorney-client privilege while 
simultaneously violating the secrecy that the privilege was intended to 
advance through purposeful disclosure, noting that “the Eighth 
Circuit’s ‘limited waiver’ rule has little to do with this confidential 
link between the client and his legal advisor.”159  Additionally, the 
court described selective waiver as unfair to third parties, whereby a 
 
Unfortunately for Occidental, however, the court determined that the existence of 
this agreement could not overcome Occidental’s general waiver of privilege through 
disclosure to the SEC.  Id. at 1220-21.  Interestingly, one commentator has noted that 
the agreement would have satisfied the “specific preservation” requirement of the 
Teachers court, and thus selective waiver would have been permitted under that test as 
a manifestation of an intent to preserve applicable privileges as was evident from the 
agreement.  See Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1214 n.104; Teachers, 521 F. Supp. 638 at 
646. 
 154 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217.  The trial court determined that another twenty-nine 
documents were fell within the ambit of the work-product protection, and while the 
circuit court observed that “[t]he record [did] not compel such a conclusion,” the 
trial court’s finding was not “clearly erroneous,” and hence was affirmed.  Id. at 1222. 
 155 Id. at 1217. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 1222. 
 158 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220 (quoting In re Grand Jury of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 
672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 159 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.  Disagreeing with the holding in Diversified, the 
Permian court noted, “[u]nlike the Eighth Circuit, we cannot see how ‘the developing 
procedure of corporations to employ independent counsel to investigate and advise 
them’ would be thwarted by telling a corporation that it cannot disclose the resulting 
reports to the SEC if it wishes to maintain their confidentiality.”  Id. at 1221 n.13 
(internal citations omitted). 
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disclosing party “cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his 
opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting [it] to 
obstruct others . . . .  The attorney-client privilege is not designed for 
such tactical employment.”160  Finally, by noting that permitting 
selective waiver in Permian would prioritize the SEC’s concerns to the 
detriment of those of the DoE, the court rejected the policy 
argument that the benefits of selective waiver outweigh its costs.161 
Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, the prospect of 
selective waiver’s widespread acceptance continued to wane.  In In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum,162 the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its rejection of 
the doctrine, noting that the protections afforded by the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product doctrine would be “available 
only at the traditional price,”163 such that a party would not be 
permitted to “waive that privilege in circumstances where disclosure 
might be beneficial while maintaining it in other circumstances 
where nondisclosure would be beneficial.”164  Likewise, in In re Martin 
Marietta Corp.,165 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit refused to allow a corporation to maintain the attorney-client 
privilege and nonopinion work-product protection over materials 
previously disclosed to the government.166 
In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
rejected selective waiver in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of 
Philippines.167  Westinghouse Electric Corp. (“Westinghouse”) was 
under investigation by the Department of Justice (“DoJ”) and the 
SEC for allegedly bribing members of the Philippine government in 
 
 160 Id. at 1221.  Quoting Justice Holmes, the court further noted “the [attorney-
client] privilege does not remain in such circumstances for the mere sake of giving 
the client an additional weapon to use or not at his choice.”  Id. (quoting Green v. 
Crapo, 62 N.E. 956, 959 (Mass. 1902)). 
 161 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. 
 162 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Duces Tecum 
involved an unsuccessful attempt by the Tesoro Petroleum Corporation to maintain 
its privileges over materials previously surrendered to the SEC and a grand jury.  Id. 
at 1368.  The D.C. Circuit permitted a group of class action plaintiffs to access those 
materials, holding that Tesoro’s disclosure of the materials to the SEC and the grand 
jury operated as a waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and work-product 
protection.  Id. at 1370-76. 
 163 Id. at 1370 (quoting Permian, 665 F.2d at 1222). 
 164 Id. 
 165 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 166 Id. at 620-23. 
 167 951 F.2d 1414, 1421-28 (1991). 
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order to secure a lucrative business contract.168  In response to the 
allegations, the corporation conducted an internal investigation into 
the matter, and turned over its results to both agencies, relying on a 
specific confidentiality agreement with the DoJ and on SEC 
regulations indicating that such materials would remain nonpublic.169  
Nine years later, the Republic of the Philippines brought their own 
suit against Westinghouse in a federal district court, alleging inter alia 
fraud, conspiracy, and RICO violations.170  The Philippine 
government sought the materials surrendered to the DoJ and the 
SEC, arguing that the disclosure by Westinghouse operated as a 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
protection, otherwise applicable to those materials.171  Westinghouse 
responded by claiming that it had only selectively waived its privileges 
to the materials, and supported its argument by pointing to the 
confidentiality arrangement with the DoJ and relevant SEC 
regulations.172  Unsympathetic to the corporation’s position, the 
Third Circuit ruled that Westinghouse had fully waived its privileges, 
and permitted the Philippine government to access the documents.173 
The Westinghouse court first observed that selective waiver 
“extend[s] the [attorney-client] privilege beyond its intended 
purpose.”174  Selective waiver, it said, “does not serve the purpose of 
encouraging full disclosure to one’s attorney . . . it merely encourages 
voluntary disclosure to government agencies.”175  Because selective 
waiver rests on different policy considerations than those that support 
the attorney-client privilege, the Third Circuit held that to recognize 
selective waiver would be in effect to recognize a new privilege, 
something which federal courts had long been cautioned to avoid.176  
While acknowledging the potential benefits that could be derived 
 
 168 Id. at 1418-19.  Specifically, Westinghouse sought permission to construct the 
Philippines’ first nuclear power plant.  Id. at 1418. 
 169 Id. at 1418-19. 
 170 Id. at 1420. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 1426. 
 173 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1431. 
 174 Id. at 1425. 
 175 Id.  The court further observed that “[b]ecause the selective waiver rule in 
Diversified protects disclosures made for entirely different purposes, it cannot be 
reconciled with traditional attorney-client privilege doctrine.”  Id. 
 176 Id. (citing Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)) (noting that 
“because privileges obstruct the truth-finding process, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly warned the federal to be cautious in recognizing new privileges.”). 
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from permitting selective waiver, the court believed these benefits 
were not of sufficient magnitude to allow further hindrance of the 
truth-finding process.177 The court also observed that Congress had an 
opportunity in 1984 to adopt selective waiver, but elected not to do 
so.178  Because  “under traditional waiver doctrine a voluntary 
disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-client privilege even if 
the third party agrees not to disclose the communications to anyone 
else,” the court deemed Westinghouse’s agreement with the DoJ 
irrelevant.179 
The Westinghouse court was equally dismissive of the 
corporation’s arguments that the work-product protection was 
applicable to the previously disclosed materials.180  Noting that the 
work-product doctrine is intended to prevent “an attorney’s work 
product from falling into the hands of an adversary,”181 the court 
determined that “a party . . . may continue to assert the doctrine’s 
protection only when the disclosure furthers the doctrine’s 
underlying goal.”182  The court held that Westinghouse had waived 
the work-product protection against all adversaries through its 
disclosures to the SEC and DoJ, as disclosures to “forestall 
prosecution . . . or to obtain lenient treatment” are not consistent 
with the traditional objectives of the doctrine.183 
Unlike the Third Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit left open the possibility that a party could 
selectively waive applicable privileges in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.184  
Steinhardt Partners (“Steinhardt”), under investigation for price 
manipulation of securities,185 disclosed materials to the SEC without a 
confidentiality agreement.186  When civil plaintiffs sought the 
materials to aid in their suit against the firm, Steinhardt claimed that 
the materials were protected by the work-product doctrine.187  
 
 177 Id. 
 178 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427. (citing SEC Statement in Support of Proposed §24(d) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 458, 461 (Mar. 
2, 1984)). 
 179 Id. at 1427. 
 180 Id. at 1429. 
 181 Id. at 1428. 
 182 Id. at 1429. 
 183 Id. 
 184 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 185 Id. at 232. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
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Although the court ruled that Steinhardt had waived its privilege in 
that case, the court declined to adopt “a per se rule that all voluntary 
disclosures to the government waive work-product protection.”188  It 
noted that, “[e]stablishing a rigid rule [rejecting selective waiver 
outright] would fail to anticipate situations in which the disclosing 
party and the government . . . have entered into an explicit 
agreement that the [government agency] will maintain the 
confidentiality of the disclosed materials.”189 Therefore, the Second 
Circuit acknowledged that disclosures made to a government agency, 
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, may permit the corporation 
to assert applicable privileges against other parties despite the prior 
disclosure.190 
Despite this small victory for supporters of the selective waiver 
doctrine, other federal circuits followed the Third Circuit’s lead in 
rejecting the selective waiver doctrine outright, regardless of the 
existence of a confidentiality agreement.191  In United States v. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,192 while the parties did not enter 
into a confidentiality agreement, “the [First Circuit] disposed of the 
selective waiver doctrine with such a broad stroke [that] it seems that 
the existence of a confidentiality agreement would have made little 
difference.”193  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, in Genentech v. United States International Trade 
Commission,194 refused to apply the doctrine.195  Most recently in In re 
 
 188 Id. at 236. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236.  In addition, “[s]everal federal district courts, 
including those in New York, California, and Colorado, have suggested that selective 
waiver is permissible if the disclosing party enters into a confidentiality agreement 
and expressly reserves its rights to assert privileges against third parties.”  Greenwald 
& Thomas, supra note 23, at 12; In re Leslie Fay Co. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 284 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993); 
Kirkland v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 191 See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d 289; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681; Genentech, 
122 F.3d 1409. 
 192 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 193 Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 12 (citing Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 
at 685).  In Mass. Inst. of Tech., the Internal Revenue Service sought documents 
previously disclosed to the Department of Defense (“DoD”) by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (“MIT”).  Id. at 683.  MIT asserted the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protection over the documents; however, the First Circuit 
found that those privileges had been waived through MIT’s disclosure of those 
documents to the DoD.  Id. at 685. 
 194 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 195 Id. at 1417.  As observed by the Federal Circuit, “[t]his court . . . has never 
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Columbia/HCA Healthcare Billing Practices Litigation,196 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected selective waiver “in any 
of its various forms,”197 despite the existence of an applicable 
confidentiality agreement,198 and held that adopting selective waiver 
would transform privilege into “a sword rather than a shield.”199 
III. SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE SHOULD BE UNIVERSALLY ADOPTED 
Supporters of selective waiver argue that the doctrine 
encourages increased cooperation between corporations and the 
government,200 “[p]romot[es]  [h]eightened [o]bservance of [l]aws 
and [r]egulations,”201 and reduces costs for both the investigatory 
agencies and the judiciary.202  In addition, cooperation may increase 
the likelihood that the malfeasance at issue will cease, and those 
perpetrating the crimes will be prosecuted.203  While the hopeful days 
of Diversified have long since passed, perhaps the current climate of 
corporate scandal and malfeasance warrants giving selective waiver a 
second chance.  The recent enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act204 
and the Enron and WorldCom collapses have caused directors of 
American corporations “to conduct internal investigations at the first 
sign of trouble.”205  The fruits of these investigations would surely 
serve a greater societal purpose by being placed in the hands of a 
regulatory agency rather than ending up in a paper shredder.  While 
selective waiver unfortunately does not fall within the ambit of 
 
recognized such a limited waiver.”  Also, “[the plaintiff] has presented no compelling 
arguments as to why we should apply such a limited waiver theory in this case.”  Id. 
 196 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).  In Columbia/HCA, private litigants sought access 
to certain materials previously disclosed to the DoJ by Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corporation (“Columbia/HCA”), pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, in order 
to assist in a Medicare fraud suit against Columbia/HCA.  Id. at 291-92.  The Sixth 
Circuit determined that Columbia/HCA had waived the attorney-client privilege and 
work-product protection through its disclosure to the DoJ.  Id. at 302. 
 197 Id. at 302. 
 198 Id. at 292. 
 199 Id. at 307. 
 200 See Hall, supra note 27, at 994. 
 201 Hall, supra note 27, at 995. 
 202 See id. at 996-97. 
 203 See Thomas M. McMahon, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 474 PRAC. 
LAW INST./LIT. 319, 452 (1993) (noting that New Jersey’s voluntary disclosure 
procedure requires “the nature and extent of the offense and the individuals 
responsible for the criminal conduct”). 
 204 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. (2002) 
 205 Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11. 
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“traditional” privilege doctrine, the important societal benefits made 
available by selective waiver, with only minimal costs, warrant 
recognition of selective waiver in the form of a new privilege.  Before 
addressing the arguments that support this conclusion, we briefly 
review the arguments against selective waiver. 
A. Arguments Against Selective Waiver 
Critics of selective waiver are initially suspicious that compliance 
with applicable laws can actually be achieved through adoption of the 
doctrine.206  Pointing to evidence showing voluntary disclosures to the 
government despite the absence of selective waiver,207 some have 
concluded that the doctrine’s speculative benefits cannot justify a 
radical departure from traditional waiver concepts.208 
Critics also charge that the selective waiver doctrine, even if 
effective in encouraging disclosure to government agencies, is 
inherently unfair to private litigants.209  Most notably, the Permian 
court invoked this “fairness doctrine,”210 and held that permitting a 
party to “pick and choose” among those to whom it will disclose 
confidential information would be unfair to those third parties to 
whom disclosures are not made.211  One commentator, seizing upon 
this reasoning, has argued that “[w]ithin the limits of legislative 
authorization, the judicial system should not discriminate between 
private parties and government agencies; justice demands that all 
litigants be treated by the same rules.”212  In addition, some critics of 
selective waiver point out that the public goals promoted by litigation 
brought by regulatory agencies are also promoted by litigation 
 
 206 See Dorris, supra note 10, at 822-23.  Relying on the aforementioned data 
concerning corporation participation in the Voluntary Disclosure Program for the 
year 1979, Dorris contended that “[t]he SEC-corporation privilege within the limited 
waiver rule thus can be abandoned without significantly decreasing voluntary 
disclosures to the SEC.” Id.; see infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text. 
 207 See id. 
 208 See id. 
 209 See Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22. 
 210 Id.; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 (describing the D.C. Circuit’s assertion that 
the selective waiver doctrine was unfair as an application of the “fairness doctrine”). 
 211 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22.  As noted by the Permian court, “[i]t is apparent 
that such a doctrine would enable litigants to pick and choose among regulatory 
agencies in disclosing and withholding communications of tarnished confidentiality 
for their own purposes. . . .  [A] litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must 
maintain genuine confidentiality.”  Id. 
 212 Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1218-19. 
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brought by public interest groups.213 
The main criticism of the selective waiver doctrine, however, 
focuses upon the inherent difficulty that arises when attempting to 
reconcile the doctrine with traditional notions of the attorney-client 
privilege and the work-product protection.214  The underlying 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and 
frank communications between attorneys and their clients,”215 
whereas the work-product protection is intended to ensure the 
proper function of the adversarial system by generally preventing 
adversaries from discovering each other’s trial strategies.216  Selective 
waiver, it is argued, departs from the intended purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege, for while the doctrine may encourage 
disclosure to the government, it does not serve to promote full 
disclosure between a client and his attorney.217  Likewise, the purpose 
of the work-product protection is said not to be advanced through 
selective waiver, as the promotion of disclosures to the government 
are “foreign to the objectives [of preserving the adversarial system] 
underlying the work-product doctrine.”218  Finally, opponents of the 
selective waiver theory hold that permitting a party to “selectively 
waive” the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection 
conflicts with the general rule that privileges are to be “narrowly 
construed” and not extended beyond their intended purpose.219 
B. Justifying Selective Waiver 
Selective waiver should be universally adopted because it 
encourages cooperation between offending corporations and the 
government, thereby reducing costs while simultaneously enhancing 
law enforcement capabilities.220  Selective waiver does not suffer 
under a “fairness” analysis, for it does not prevent third parties from 
 
 213 Id. at 1219. 
 214 See infra notes 260-283 and accompanying text. 
 215 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
 216 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. 
 217 See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text. 
 218 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1429. 
 219 See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (holding that “[b]ecause the attorney-client 
privilege inhibits the truth-finding process, it has been narrowly construed, . . . and 
courts have been vigilant to prevent litigants from converting the privilege into a tool 
for selective disclosure.” (citations omitted)). 
 220 See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 
2002); Hall, supra note 27, at 995-96. 
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bringing their own suit, and moreover, the doctrine would not place 
most private litigants in any worse position than they would be 
without selective waiver.221  These benefits, and the lack of significant 
costs, justify holding the government and private litigants to separate 
standards with regard to selective waiver.  Selective waiver, however, 
undeniably departs from the traditional goals of the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protection.  Given that these privileges 
are to be narrowly construed, selective waiver can more accurately be 
described as a new “corporation-government” privilege,222 rather than 
mere extensions of the more familiar privileges.223  The social benefits 
of this new privilege far outweigh its drawbacks, and entrenching the 
entire realm of privilege within the bounds of traditionalism makes 
little sense. 
1. The Benefits of Selective Waiver 
The absence of selective waiver deprives government agencies of 
potentially valuable information that could otherwise assist them in 
the enforcement of applicable laws.224  Full disclosure of 
incriminating materials by corporations to the government increases 
the likelihood that the perpetrators of corporate malfeasance will be 
brought to justice.225  In effect, individuals apt to commit white-collar 
crime will be discouraged from doing so under a regime in which 
corporate books revealing such wrongdoing are accessible to law 
enforcement.  Additionally, a stipulation of the government’s offer of 
leniency could reasonably include a demand that the target 
corporation increase its internal compliance efforts, to further ensure 
that such wrongdoing will be prevented in the future.  As a whole, 
society benefits from selective waiver because encouraging corporate 
disclosure results in greater adherence to applicable laws and 
regulations. 
Society also benefits from selective waiver in that corporate 
 
 221 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.14. 
 222 See Dorris, supra note 10, at 801-06.  Dorris describes selective waiver as “[a]n 
SEC-Corporation [p]rivilege in [d]isguise,” for it encourages a target corporation to 
voluntarily disclose incriminating materials to the SEC, in hopes of leniency, as 
opposed to furthering the goals of the attorney-client privilege or work-product 
protection.  Id.  Extending this notion beyond merely disclosures to the SEC to 
disclosures to any government agency renders the privilege a “corporation-
government” privilege.  Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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cooperation with government agencies decreases costs related to 
lengthy investigations.226  Apart from increasing the likelihood that 
these inquiries will bear fruit, “encouraging corporations to disclose 
their internal investigations confidentially allows [a government 
agency] to resolve its investigation expeditiously and efficiently.”227  A 
recent amicus curiae brief submitted by the SEC revealed that the 
agency substantially benefited from voluntary disclosures from 
certain targets, from which it was able to avoid incurring costs 
associated with “approximately 29,000 hours of work.”228  Such time 
and cost savings permit agencies to resolve “a higher volume of 
investigations,” thereby permitting further enforcement of applicable 
laws and decreasing the potential for corporate criminal activity.229  
These public policy advantages further strengthen the case that 
selective waiver should be universally adopted. 
2. Fairness of Selective Waiver to Third Parties 
Selective waiver may appear initially repugnant as seemingly 
“unfair to third parties,” for it permits corporations to retain 
privileges despite prior disclosures to the government, yet assert those 
same privileges against subsequent litigants.230Selective waiver, 
however, imposes only a limited burden upon subsequent litigants, 
while simultaneously providing the incentives necessary to encourage 
corporations to provide much needed disclosures.  Although 
subsequent litigants as a whole are slightly worse off with a selective 
waiver rule in place, the benefits of selective waiver far outweigh its 
costs. 
Advocates of selective waiver, including the SEC,231 contend that 
the doctrine is Pareto optimal,232 that is, that it places subsequent 
litigants in no worse a position than they would otherwise be in without 
 
 226 See Hall, supra note 27, at 995-96; Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8. 
 227 Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8. 
 228 Id. at *8 n.55. 
 229 Id. at *8. 
 230 See supra notes 209-213 and accompanying text. 
 231 Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 (summarizing the SEC’s position on the 
selective waiver issue, as well as noting that the SEC believes that private litigants are 
no worse off under a selective waiver rule than otherwise).  For over twenty years the 
SEC advocated that the selective waiver doctrine should be adopted.  See supra note 
330 and accompanying text. 
 232 “Pareto optimality” is defined as “[a]n economic situation in which no person 
can be made better off without making someone else worse off.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
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a selective waiver rule.233  This assumes that a corporation, without the 
benefit of selective waiver, will never elect to disclose materials to a 
government agency because of the threat that those materials will 
eventually be used against the corporation in a later lawsuit.  If this 
assumption is accurate, subsequent litigants would be in no worse a 
position under selective waiver than under the current regime: if 
such materials are not initially disclosed, they are obviously not later 
obtainable by subsequent litigants.234 
This argument ignores the fact that corporate disclosures 
continue to occur, even though selective waiver is generally not 
permitted.235  Imagine that a corporation, in the absence of a selective 
waiver rule, weighs its options, discloses otherwise privileged 
materials to the government, and concludes that the benefits of 
disclosure outweigh its costs.  Without selective waiver, a private 
litigant who seeks those materials will be able to obtain them despite 
a privilege assertion by the corporation.  If selective waiver were 
implemented, the private litigant would be unable to obtain those 
same materials even though the disclosing corporation would have 
been willing to make the same disclosure whether selective waiver was 
available or not.  Hence, the argument that private litigants are 
treated equally with or without selective waiver is not entirely true. 
This raises the question of when a corporation would willingly 
make a disclosure in the absence of selective waiver, knowing that 
such materials are susceptible to later discovery.  As mentioned, 
 
 233 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.14.  Although ultimately rejecting 
selective waiver, the Third Circuit conceded that “when a client discloses privileged 
information to a government agency, the private litigant in subsequent proceedings 
is no worse off than it would have been had the disclosure to the agency not 
occurred.” Id.; Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (contending “disclosure to one 
adversary does not prejudice a subsequent adversary any more than it would have if 
the initial disclosure had never been made.”); Developments in the Law, supra note 10, 
at 1645 (observing that “[b]ecause the privilege-holder’s adversary stands in no 
better or worse position than if the selective disclosure never occurred, selective 
disclosure . . . poses little threat of unfairness.”); Implementation, supra note 8, at 
6312 (noting “[a]t worst, private litigants would be in exactly the same position that 
they would have been in if the [SEC] had not obtained the privileged or protected 
materials.”). 
 234 See Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312. 
 235 See, e.g., Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 293.  Despite the overwhelming amount of 
authority rejecting selective waiver, Columbia/HCA disclosed otherwise privileged 
materials to the DoJ.  Id.  With or without selective waiver, government disclosures 
are likely to continue to occur, although they are likely to be fewer in number 
without the incentives created by a selective waiver rule.  See infra notes 236-242 and 
accompanying text. 
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supporters of selective waiver have cited the disclosures made 
pursuant to the SEC’s short-lived Voluntary Disclosure Program as 
evidence that corporations need no additional incentives to 
cooperate with government investigations.236  Such data, however, are 
misleading.  First, although 425 corporations are said to have 
participated in the Voluntary Disclosure Program in a single year,237 
the degree of specificity provided within those disclosures is unclear.  
It is rational to assume that a rule affording protection to voluntary 
disclosures would increase corporations’ willingness to cooperate 
more fully, even though some level of cooperation can be achieved 
without such a rule.  Second, the disclosures made pursuant to the 
Voluntary Disclosure Program occurred shortly after the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Diversified, at a time when corporations may have 
been confident that courts would generally recognize a selective 
waiver rule.238  Third, the fact that some corporations have 
participated in the Voluntary Disclosure Program without selective 
waiver does not reflect the amount of cooperation that could be 
achieved if a rule protecting voluntary disclosures were to exist. 
Since the essence of privilege is confidentiality, statistical 
information concerning the reasons for nondisclosure is difficult to 
obtain.  As is the case with respect to the attorney-client privilege and 
the work-product protection, policy choices concerning whether to 
adopt or expand a particular privilege are rarely supported by hard 
data.239  Nevertheless, despite this lack of data, it appears that many 
valuable disclosures are not made because no general rule exists to 
maintain privileged status over otherwise privileged materials 
voluntarily turned over to the government.  Parties typically defend 
their privileges unless dire circumstances or foolishness effectuate 
their voluntary surrender.240  Practitioners generally advise that 
disclosures to the government should be avoided whenever possible, 
 
 236 See Dorris, supra note 10, at 822 (observing that in 1979, over 425 corporations 
participated in the SEC’s Voluntary Disclosure Program); Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 
1426 (citing Dorris, supra note 10, at 822). 
 237 Dorris, supra note 10, at 822. 
 238 Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 239 See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (citing no data, but in support of adopting 
the work-product doctrine, noting that without such protection, “[t]he effect on the 
legal community would be demoralizing.  And the interests of clients and the cause 
of justice would be poorly served.”). 
 240 See Cynthia B. Feegan, Comment, Issues of Waiver in Multi-Party Litigation: The 
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 61 UMKC L. REV. 757, 760 (1993) 
(noting that “[i]nstances of express waiver are rare . . . .”). 
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as the fallout from losing privileged status over sensitive materials can 
be catastrophic.241  Furthermore, the fact that the SEC continues to 
support selective waiver suggests that it believes a vast amount of 
information is lost due to fears, founded or unfounded, that 
disclosed materials could be made public.242 
Given increased availability of potentially valuable disclosures 
which could be realized through selective waiver, and the relatively 
few disclosures presently made in its absence, selective waiver 
approaches Pareto optimality even if it does not achieve it absolutely.  
The prospective costs associated with a poorly chosen disclosure 
cause corporations to resist cooperation, therefore placing most 
private litigants in no worse a position than they would be under a 
selective waiver regime.  The aforementioned social benefits 
associated with the doctrine more than offset the advantages gained 
by the small number of litigants who benefit from the current 
absence of selective waiver. 
Far from constituting an offensive or unfair use of privilege,243 
selective waiver permits the aforementioned public policy concerns to 
be advanced, but at little cost to third parties.244  The presence or 
absence of selective waiver likely weighs heavily in a corporation’s 
decision to disclose or not to disclose sensitive materials to the 
government.245  Without the ability to retain privileges after the initial 
disclosure, a corporation is similarly likely to refuse to make such 
disclosures.246  Thus, government agencies are deprived access to 
many useful materials, as are subsequent litigants.  If selective waiver 
were adopted, the corporation would be more likely to cooperate 
with the government and make full disclosure of privileged 
documents.  Rather than being unfair to private litigants, who may 
 
 241 See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12. 
 242 Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 (“[T]he [SEC] finds that allowing 
issuers to produce internal reports to the [SEC] . . . without waiving otherwise 
applicable privileges serves the public interest because it significantly enhances 
[SEC’s] ability to conduct expeditious investigations . . . .”). 
 243 See supra notes 54, 160 and accompanying text. 
 244 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.14. 
 245 See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 50. 
 246 Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *9.  As noted by the Saito court: 
Imposing the harsh consequence of a waiver upon disclosing parties 
will discourage confidential disclosures.  When the benefits of 
leniency . . . are uncertain, yet the burden of exposing a company’s 
Achilles’ heel to a flood of adversaries is certain, corporations will be 
less likely to choose to disclose work product to the SEC. 
Id. 
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still bring suit, “litigating [third parties] want to have their cake and 
eat it too: they want disclosing parties to continue disclosing to 
[government agencies] so they are better protected, while at the 
same time they want access to these disclosures for their own tactical 
advantage.”247 
3. The Unique Role of the Government Litigant 
A selective waiver rule which permits privileges to be asserted 
against private litigants despite prior government disclosures disrupts 
the equal treatment all litigants are currently provided.248  Selective 
waiver necessarily requires that the government be “given special 
favor when it comes to benefiting from selective waiver of 
privilege.”249  It is true that to some degree that private suits also 
vindicate the public interest by punishing corporate malfeasance.250  
Nonetheless, there are good reasons for believing that government 
suits are generally better suited to serving public interests.  Private 
litigants are often sidetracked in their effort to be made whole.251  
Since the primary motivation in private suits is damages, rather than 
remedying future harms, private litigants most often lack the 
necessary focus upon curative measures.252  By contrast, government 
suits are focused on remedying and preventing illegal behavior. 253  
 
 247 Id. 
 248 See Jody Okrzesik, Note, Selective Waiver: Should the Government Be Privy to 
Privileged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product 
Doctrine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 115, 167-68 (2003). 
 249 Id. 
 250 Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303 (contending that “[a] plaintiff in a shareholder 
derivative action or a qui tam action who exposes accounting and tax fraud provides 
as much service to the ‘truth finding process’ as an SEC investigator”). 
 251 Id. at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (observing that “[p]rivate litigants, often 
encouraged by large potential liability, on balance will have a greater incentive to 
press the legal envelope and to pursue legal actions less certainly within the public 
interest.”). 
 252 See id. 
 253 See EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1291 (11th Cir. 2004).  The 
Pemco court observed: 
This principle is based primarily upon the recognition that the United 
States has an interest in enforcing federal law that is independent of 
any claims of private citizens. . . . It is precisely this public interest 
function that distinguishes governmental agencies from private 
litigants, . . . these agencies have responsibilities with a scope far 
beyond the legal interests of individual plaintiffs. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Matthews, Why 
Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 31 (2004) (observing that when 
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This, coupled with the government’s ability to levy criminal penalties, 
warrants different treatment of these two classes of litigants. 
In his dissenting opinion in Columbia/HCA, Judge Boggs 
outlined four reasons why treating the government differently from 
private litigants in the context of selective waiver is justifiable.254  First, 
Judge Boggs posited that, due to the limited resources and financial 
impartiality of a government investigation, the “government 
investigations are more likely to be in the public interest.”255  Second, 
he observed that the government’s authority to fine or imprison 
offenders gives government investigations a unique character.256  
Third, “[t]he costs and benefits of government investigations are 
diffuse, and therefore managing those costs and benefits most 
efficiently is definitionally in the public interest.”257  Lastly, Judge 
Boggs noted that the more stringent procedural requirements of a 
criminal matter, as opposed to a civil one, should permit disclosures 
to a government entity, while shielding those disclosures from private 
litigants.258 
“Unlike private litigants, government litigants ‘represent and 
serve a public constituency, even in litigation.’”259  Although at risk of 
being labeled paternalistic, selective waiver better equips the 
government to pursue the public interest while having little or no 
effect upon private suits.  Recognizing the fundamental differences 
between the goals and limitations of the private and government 
litigant makes clear that distinguishing the two in the manner that 
selective waiver demands is justified. 
 
private litigants are induced to further the public interest through enforcement of 
their individual private rights, those litigants are often referred to as “private 
attorneys general.”). 
 254 Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).  For a complete 
discussion of Justice Boggs’ dissent, see Okrzesik, supra note 248, at 164-70. 
 255 Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).While private suits may 
not vindicate public interests effectively due to personal matters at stake, it has been 
argued that unlike private litigants, public interest groups who initiate suit do so free 
from personal interests.  See id.; Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1219.  Public interest 
groups, however, are not investigatory arms of a democratically elected government, 
and therefore should not be entitled to benefit from selective disclosure.  See infra 
note 257 and accompanying text. 
 256 Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 257 Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 258 Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 259 Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s 
New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 810 (2004). 
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4. Reconciling Selective Waiver with Traditional Privilege 
Concepts 
The most frequent source of criticism of selective waiver arises 
from the apparent inconsistencies between the underlying purposes 
of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, and the 
underlying function of selective waiver.260  Selective waiver encourages 
disclosure to the government, which although laudable, is an end 
different in kind from encouraging disclosure to one’s attorney261 or 
maintaining the integrity of the adversarial system.262  The correct 
response to this fact, however, is not to reject selective waiver but 
rather to recognize it as a new “corporation-government” privilege.263 
a. Selective Waiver and The Attorney-Client Privilege 
Proponents of selective waiver, however, have often sought to fit 
the square peg of selective waiver into the round hole of traditional 
privilege constructions.264  The Diversified court attempted to reconcile 
the objectives of the attorney-client privilege with those of selective 
waiver by observing that corporations may elect not to hire counsel to 
conduct internal investigations in response to allegations of 
wrongdoing without the doctrine.265  It has also been argued that a 
corporation “who cooperates with a government investigation is 
seeking ‘informed legal advice’ with the objective of fully complying 
with the applicable laws and regulations.”266  A corporation, however, 
may acquire legal advice from an attorney without disclosing those 
communications to a government agency.267  While the attorney-client 
privilege is said to “promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice,”268 this goal is merely 
the desired by-product of fostering “full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients.”269 
 
 260 See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1219; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1429; Steinhardt, 9 
F.3d at 235; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 684; Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306.  See 
also, Hall, supra note 27, at 1000. 
 261 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 262 Id. 
 263 See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text. 
 264 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 27, at 1000-01. 
 265 See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611. 
 266 Hall, supra note 27, at 1000. 
 267 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. 
 268 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
 269 Id. 
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Expanding the privilege to include communications between 
corporations and non-attorney third parties vitiates the general 
principle that existing evidentiary privileges are to be narrowly 
construed.270  Often, these communications could be said to only bear 
an attenuated relation with promoting “observance of the law.”271  
Such a rule could enable virtually any communication between two 
parties to be privileged provided that it is intended to bring the 
disclosing party within compliance with applicable laws.  Construing 
the attorney-client privilege in this manner reduces the attorney to 
the status of a middleman, bridging the gap between the traditional 
attorney-client privilege and a new privilege protecting disclosures by 
a corporation to the government.272  As such, selective waiver can 
more accurately be described as creating a new realm of protected 
communications.273 
b. Selective Waiver and the Work-Product Protection 
Attempts to harmonize selective waiver with the underlying goals 
of the work-product protection likewise suffer from a similar 
disconnect.  As mentioned, the work-product doctrine is intended to 
preserve the nature of the adversary system by protecting documents 
and tangible things prepared by or on behalf of an attorney in 
anticipation of litigation from discovery.274  A disclosure of such 
would-be protected materials to an adversary results in a waiver of the 
privilege vis-à-vis all parties.275  Typically, when a corporation discloses 
materials otherwise protected by the work-product doctrine to the 
government, this act is considered an implied waiver of the privilege, 
as the government is most often considered an adversary.276  Even the 
Eighth Circuit, despite the Diversified holding, rejects the application 
of selective waiver to the work-product doctrine.277 
 
 270 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974). 
 271 Id. While corporations may seek full future compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations, it is naïve to assume that a corporation’s decision to disclose 
materials is motivated by the desire to achieve compliance with applicable laws rather 
than desire to avoid harsh punishment. 
 272 See Dorris, supra note 10, at 805-06. 
 273 See id. at 806. 
 274 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. 
 275 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
 276 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 277 See In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program, 860 F.2d 844, 
846 (8th Cir. 1988).  In Chrysler, the Eighth Circuit held that a corporation’s 
disclosure of materials otherwise covered by the work-product protection, were 
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Corporations have often sought to claim that work product 
disclosures to government agencies fall within the ambit of the 
common interest exception,278 which permits non-adversarial 
disclosures without waiver of the work-product protection.279  
Proponents of selective waiver argue that “because both the 
government and the cooperating [corporation] are likely to be 
working toward a similar goal (the disclosing party’s compliance with 
laws and regulations) the parties can be said to share common 
interests in the matter.”280  Such arguments always fail to sway courts, 
as even those few courts that embrace selective waiver reject them.281  
It is difficult to view the relationship between the investigating 
government agency and the target corporation as anything other 
than adversarial, given that the government seeks to criminally 
 
discoverable by the government by virtue of their prior disclosure to certain class 
action plaintiffs.  Id.  While Chrysler did not make mention of Diversified with respect 
to selective waiver, the issue of whether Diversified continued to remain good law in 
light of Chrysler came before a district court within the Eighth Circuit in McDonnell 
Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 243.  Reconciling Chrysler and Diversified, the district court 
distinguished Chrysler on the grounds that it involved the work-product protection, 
unlike Diversified, which exclusively addressed the selective waiver issue within the 
context of the attorney-client privilege.  Id.  Thus, selective waiver does not apply to 
the work-product protection in the Eighth Circuit. Id. Interestingly, however, “[w]hy 
waiver doctrine should require different resolutions for voluntary disclosures of 
attorney-client work product rather than attorney-client privileged communications 
was not examined [by the McDonnell Douglas court] in terms of any policy 
justifications associated with either doctrine.”  James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client 
Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging 
Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 658 n.81 (1997).  Of course, Chrysler is 
also distinguishable from Diversified on the grounds that the initial disclosure made 
in Chrysler was made to a private party, and a privilege was asserted against the 
government, whereas in Diversified, the initial disclosure was made to the 
government, and a privilege was asserted against a private party.  See Chrysler, 860 F.2d 
at 845-46; Diversified, 572 F.2d at 600. 
 278 See, e.g., Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 314 (Boggs, J., dissenting); Westinghouse, 
951 F.2d at 1431; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686 (holding the common interest 
exception inapplicable as the corporation was considered an adversary of the 
government, not a party sharing a common interest with the government). 
 279 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 280 Hall, supra note 27, at 998. 
 281 See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *5.  As observed by the chancery court: 
The common interest question here boils down to whether the 
[investigating agency] acts as a friend or foe. . . . [The disclosing 
corporation] knew it was a target [and] knew the disclosure was being 
sought as part of this investigation. . . . The fact that [the disclosing 
corporation] ‘cooperated voluntarily does not transform the 
relationship from adversarial to friendly. 
Id. at *4-*5.  (internal citations omitted). 
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punish the corporation.282  While the nature of the adversarial 
relationship is unique in that the parties include law enforcement 
and a suspected offender, in contrast with opposing civil litigants, the 
parties are adversaries nonetheless.283  As the work-product doctrine 
does not distinguish between criminal and civil adversaries, selective 
waiver does not fit neatly within the parameters of the work-product 
protection. 
c. Selective Waiver and the Self-Evaluative Privilege 
The self-evaluative privilege limits the discoverability of certain 
self-critical analyses, the accuracy of which are of great public import, 
and the accuracy of which could potentially be compromised if 
discovery were to be permitted.284  Although first recognized in 
1970,285 the self-evaluative privilege has been met with significant 
skepticism, with some courts suggesting that the Supreme Court has 
implicitly rejected the new privilege entirely.286  Apart from the 
privilege’s uncertain validity,287 finer points of the self-evaluative 
privilege reveal that even if the privilege is judicially accepted, it does 
not embrace selective waiver.288 
Although materials disclosed pursuant to a government 
investigation may be of significant public importance, the accuracy, 
creation, or disclosure of which could be chilled if no privilege were 
applicable to them, “courts may be inclined to allow a waiver of the 
self-evaluative privilege through voluntary disclosures to a 
government agency.”289  First, while “a self-evaluative review may be 
 
 282 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428 (“Unlike a party who assists the government 
in investigating or prosecuting another, . . . Westinghouse was the target of 
investigations conducted by the agencies.  Under these circumstances, we have no 
difficulty concluding that the SEC and the DOJ were Westinghouse’s adversaries.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 283 See id. 
 284 See Conway, supra note 84, at 634; Ronald G. Blum & Andrew J. Turro, The Self-
Evaluative Privilege in the Second Circuit: Dead or Alive?, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 44, 44 (June 
2003).  The self-evaluative privilege is also known as the self-critical analysis privilege.  
Id. 
 285 See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970). 
 286 See Blum & Turro, supra note 284, at 45 (observing that “[s]everal local federal 
district courts suggest that the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision in University of 
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 492 U.S. 182 (1990) 
conclusively rejects the very basis of the privilege.”). 
 287 Id. 
 288 See Conway, supra note 84, at 656-57. 
 289 Id. at 657. 
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worthless if the results are not shared with certain federal agencies,” 
the privilege does not specifically contemplate the issue of waiver.290  
Second, by law many courts require corporations to conduct the self-
critical analysis.291  As a voluntary disclosure of sensitive materials to 
the government does not appear to fall within the grasp of the 
sporadically accepted self-evaluative privilege,292 selective waivers are 
not readily permissible within the protections afforded by the self-
evaluative privilege. 
d. Selective Waiver as a New Corporation-Government 
Privilege 
The previous discussion demonstrates that existing evidentiary 
privileges rest on policy considerations different from those that 
support selective waiver. Selective waiver should, therefore,  be 
recognized as a new evidentiary privilege, a corporation-government 
privilege, rather than a mere extension of existing privileges.  In this 
way, the integrity of our existing privileges remains because they do 
not become riddled with exceptions.  Just as an attenuated argument 
can be made to fit the attorney work-product protection within the 
parameters of the attorney-client privilege, the two privileges indeed 
are unique and apply in different circumstances.  Similarly, the 
selective waiver doctrine is a creature distinct from any of our existing 
privileges. 
Evidentiary privileges are a cause for concern “because they 
impede the search for truth.”293  Consequently, a new privilege should 
not be created “unless it ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to 
outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”294  As the previous 
discussion demonstrates, selective waiver encourages a corporation 
under criminal investigation to disclose otherwise privileged material, 
thereby allowing for the expeditious resolution of such inquiries.295  
The increased likelihood of bringing the perpetrators to justice, and 
the increased potential that similar corporate malfeasance will not 
occur again, however, come at the cost of certain evidence being 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 637. 
 292 Id. at 641. 
 293 Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 130 (2003). 
 294 Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 
(1980)). 
 295 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425-29. 
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unavailable at subsequent civil trials.296  While perhaps the absence of 
such evidence may “impede the search for truth”297 in civil trials, the 
corporation, “by waiving the privilege as to the [g]overnment[,] . . . 
furthers the truth-finding process” with respect to the criminal 
investigation.298  As mentioned, this evidence may come to neither the 
government nor the civil litigant if selective waiver is not permitted.299  
The government’s unique role as protector of the public interest at 
large warrants this type of specialized treatment.300  In sum, a new 
corporation-government privilege would enhance the overall truth-
finding process. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING SELECTIVE WAIVER 
The inquiry into whether selective waiver should be adopted 
does not end by merely concluding that a new privilege embodying 
selective waiver concepts should be received.  Multiple forms of the 
doctrine exist, requiring a weighing of the interests at stake 
associated with each form.  Determining the appropriate branch of 
government to adopt selective waiver is also of particular concern.  
Furthermore, the scope of the new privilege must be determined.  
This Comment concludes that selective waiver should be adopted by 
Congress in the form of a new privilege, shielding from discovery by 
private litigants only those materials which would otherwise be 
protected by traditional privileges, provided a confidentiality 
agreement is secured at the time of the initial disclosure. 
A. Selective Waiver Forms 
Selective waiver can take a variety of forms, each having its own 
unique advantages and drawbacks.  For any type of selective waiver, 
especially one construed as an entirely new privilege, an initial 
disclosure must be made to a government agency.301  One form of 
 
 296 See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303. 
 297 Guillen, 537 U.S. at 130. 
 298 Id. (quoting Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221). 
 299 See supra notes 230-247 and accompanying text. 
 300 See supra notes 254-259 and accompanying text. 
 301 An additional form of selective waiver exists, known as “general selective 
waiver.”  Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217.  General selective waiver entirely abandons 
the very notion of implied waiver, such that “a breach of confidentiality . . . in one 
setting or to one party would never effect a waiver of the privilege as to any other 
party or in any other proceeding.”  Id. at 1218.  Pursuant to a general selective 
waiver, a party could disclose privileged materials to a private litigant, yet maintain 
privileged status over those materials in subsequent litigation against the 
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selective waiver, known as “selective administrative selective waiver,” 
permits a party to maintain its privileges over materials after an initial 
disclosure to a government agency even vis-à-vis another government 
agency.302  On the other hand, the selective waiver doctrine could also 
take the form of an “overall administrative selective waiver,”303 
whereby a disclosing party would be permitted to maintain its 
applicable privileges over materials previously disclosed to a 
government agency, but only vis-à-vis private parties, such that other 
government agencies would not be thwarted in their efforts to 
subpoena the previously disclosed materials.304  This latter form of the 
doctrine appropriately balances the competing interests at stake, and 
comes closest to achieving the goals of the selective waiver doctrine. 
1. Selective Administrative Selective Waiver 
The form of the selective waiver doctrine known as selective 
administrative selective waiver may in many cases prevent one 
government agency’s access to materials previously disclosed to 
another government agency.305  In short, when a corporation makes a 
disclosure, the otherwise applicable privileges are waived only to that 
agency—the privileges would remain as to all other parties, including 
both private litigants and other government agencies.  Permian is 
illustrative of the problem a selective administrative selective waiver 
would create.306 In Permian, a corporation asserted its otherwise 
applicable privileges over materials previously disclosed to the SEC 
when the DoE sought discovery of those materials.307  Rejecting 
selective waiver, the Permian court warned that permitting selective 
waiver in such a case would allow the corporation to prioritize the 
SEC’s concerns over those of the DoE.308 
 
government.  Id.  A general selective waiver does not advance the public policy goals 
underlying the doctrine.  Id. 
 302 Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217.  The author of the aforementioned note refers 
to this form of the doctrine as “selective administrative limited waiver.”  The term 
“selective waiver,” however, is preferred over the term “limited waiver.”  See supra note 
10. 
 303 Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217 (referring to this form of the doctrine as “overall 
administrative limited waiver”). 
 304 See id. 
 305 See id. 
 306 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. 
 307 See supra notes 147-156 and accompanying text. 
 308 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. 
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2. Overall Administrative Selective Waiver 
Overall administrative selective waiver permits a disclosing 
corporation to maintain its privileges in subsequent litigation against 
private parties, but not against other federal agencies.309  Thus, 
corporations’ disclosures will not be subject to the prying eyes of 
private litigants seeking access to the disclosed materials, but 
nevertheless are at risk of being subpoenaed by other government 
agencies.310  Rejecting selective administrative selective waiver in favor 
of the “overall administrative” form of the doctrine is advantageous 
for a variety of reasons.  This construction of selective waiver removes 
impediments to government investigations, as it allows a free flow of 
information between individual government agencies.  In this way, a 
corporation is not permitted to “pick and choose among regulatory 
agencies.”311 A disclosure to one agency operates as a waiver to all 
agencies, but not to private litigants.312  Given the special role and 
powers of the government related to pursuing the public interest, it is 
proper to afford the federal government as a whole the use of the 
disclosed materials in any manner which best serves the public 
interest.313 
Yet, even if one assumes the benefits potentially achievable 
through the doctrine in the abstract, this form of the selective waiver 
is not without criticism.314  First, like other forms of selective waiver, 
overall administrative selective waiver “would give governmental 
agencies a decided advantage over private parties in the evidentiary 
process,”315 as even non-governmental public interest groups would 
not be permitted to benefit from corporate disclosures to the 
government.316  Second, since a disclosure made pursuant to an 
overall administrative waiver may be made available to other federal 
agencies, disclosing corporations must be mindful that their waiver is 
quite broad.  Permian is merely one example where one federal 
agency seeks access to materials previously disclosed to another.317  
Under this form of selective waiver, therefore, corporations may still 
 
 309 See Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217. 
 310 See id. 
 311 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22. 
 312 See supra notes 309-311. 
 313 See Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1218-19. 
 314 See id. 
 315 Id. at 1218. 
 316 Id. at 1219. 
 317 See generally Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217. 
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resist an initial waiver, as expanding the scope of waiver undermines 
corporate willingness to cooperate with government investigations. 
3. Suggested Form 
Although overall selective waiver may inhibit certain disclosures 
that would occur if the information would be available to only one 
agency, implementing an overall administrative selective waiver best 
advances the public policy goals achievable through selective waiver.  
An expansive waiver policy, i.e., one which allows federal agencies to 
share disclosed materials, is more likely to be eventually implemented 
as it constitutes a less radical shift from the current rule, which 
generally rejects selective waiver.  Although a disclosing corporation 
must be mindful that under such a rule its waiver of privilege 
operates as a waiver with regard to all federal agencies, this fact alone 
is unlikely to prevent increased cooperation with government 
investigations.  Much of the legal scholarship addressing selective 
waiver, including commentary by corporate practitioners,318 concerns 
the consequences of an initial disclosure as operating as a waiver as to 
private litigants, giving rise to the presumption that corporations are 
particularly wary of the threat of the private litigant.319  Additionally, 
the government’s position as a representative of the public in 
 
 318 See, e.g., Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11; Strassberg & Walters, supra 
note 12, at 7.  David M. Greenwald is a partner at Jenner & Block, LLC.  Greenwald 
& Thomas, supra note 23, at 11; Jenner & Block Attorney Directory, at 
http://www.jenner.com/people/bio.asp?id=46 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005); Matthew J. 
Thomas is also a partner at Jenner & Block, LLC.  Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 
23, at 11; Jenner & Block Attorney Directory, at http://www.jenner.com/ 
people/bio.asp?id=28 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).  Richard M. Strassberg is a partner 
at Goodwin Procter, LLP and served as chief of the Major Crimes Unit in the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.  Id.  Sarah E. Walters 
is a former associate at Goodwin Procter, LLP.  Press Release, Goodwin Procter, LLP, 
Goodwin Procter Attorneys Win 2004 Burton Award for Legal Achievement (June 14, 
2004) at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/press-release.asp?ID=54.  Mr. Strassberg 
and Ms. Walters were selected to receive the Burton Award for Legal Achievement, 
“which honors excellence in legal writing” for the cited article Is Selective Waiver of 
Privilege Viable?  Id.; Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. 
 319 See, e.g., Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.  Strassberg & Walters 
observed: 
It is a fair bet that any civil lawsuits that follow a government 
investigation are sure to request the disclosure of any internal 
investigation, and if the privilege no longer applies, the company may 
find itself handing over to civil plaintiffs a virtual road map to assist 
them in their lawsuit. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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general, and not merely certain private interests,320 warrants 
particularized treatment of the government litigant.321  While 
disclosures to one federal agency operate as a waiver to all federal 
agencies under the preferred form of selective waiver, this fact alone 
is unlikely to eviscerate the public policy benefits behind the 
doctrine. 
Allowing federal agencies as a whole to share disclosures among 
themselves allows for the most effective and appropriate enforcement 
of law.  Unlike private litigants, who are primarily concerned with 
their own aims,322 federal agencies, operating under the auspices of 
serving the public interest, must be permitted to make full use of 
disclosed materials so that the public is adequately protected from all 
corporate misconduct, not merely misconduct that relates to the 
duties of the agency to whom the first disclosure is made.  Although a 
broader selective waiver rule will inevitably cause certain corporations 
to refrain from cooperating with certain government investigations, 
an overall federal selective waiver is nevertheless likely to increase the 
number of disclosures that are currently made, for it effectively 
removes the threat of private litigants making use of said disclosures. 
B. Congressional Action Is Required 
Selective waiver occupies an area of legal limbo.  Neither 
legislatures nor courts have indicated that they are the appropriate 
body to embrace the doctrine.  Whereas courts claim that Congress 
may act to permit selective waiver,323 Congress has been especially 
reluctant to tinker with privilege law.324  The difficult policy 
considerations related to choosing the appropriate form of selective 
waiver, weigh heavily in favor of this matter being addressed 
legislatively.325  Conversely, courts traditionally have monopolized 
 
 320 See supra notes 254-259 and accompanying text. 
 321 See supra notes 248-259 and accompanying text. 
 322 See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 323 See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685. 
 324 See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 87-88 (2002) 
(observing that when the Federal Rules of Evidence were initially adopted, Congress, 
“displaying rare interest in the proposed rules and the rule-making process,” 
specifically rejected a section of the proposed rules codifying privilege law.). 
 325 See Karla H. Alderman, Comment, Making Sense of Oregon’s Equitable Exception to 
the American Rule of Attorney Fees after Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 
413 (1999) (observing that the United States Supreme Court has declined to rule in 
a manner which would necessarily hold certain public interests in higher esteem 
than others); see also Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 702-03 (1980) 
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privilege law,326 primarily because of their experience and 
understanding of such doctrines.327  Because courts generally reject 
selective waiver328 and Congress is hesitant to enter the privilege 
fray,329 the net result is the maintenance of the status quo.  Although 
judicial efforts to adopt selective waiver should be welcomed, the 
promise of the doctrine can likely only be realized through legislative 
action. 
In 1984, the SEC, recognizing the benefits of selective waiver, 
asked Congress to amend section 24(d) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”).330  Specifically, the SEC 
proposed that “the disclosure of any information by any person to the 
[SEC] . . . shall not constitute a waiver of any legally cognizable 
privilege,” if the disclosing party asserts the privilege and its basis 
 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that a proper interpretation of statutory text that 
results in “‘bad’ public policy” is “the concern of Congress where changes can be 
made.”); see also In re Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  The 
Terry court observed that a parent’s disclosure of incriminating statements made by 
her child to law enforcement was not protected by either the privilege against self-
incrimination nor a “penumbral” right to privacy.  Id. at 914.  The court went on to 
note that “the penumbra is limited to the relationship of husband and wife . . . [and] 
[a]ttempts to expand its dimensions to [other areas] have proved unsuccessful.”  Id. 
at 914-15 (citations omitted).  The Terry court concluded “[the fact] [t]hat the 
problem is one which should be addressed legislatively rather than judicially is 
emphasized by unanswerable questions whether the ‘privilege’ should be that of 
parent, child, or both, how the ‘privilege’ may be waived, and what exceptions, if any, 
to the ‘privilege’ should exist.”  Id. at 915 (emphasis added).  Similarly, the policy 
concerns related to the scope and form of a selective waiver rule suggest that the 
matter is better addressed through legislative action.  
 326 See Glynn, supra note 324, at 87-88. 
 327 See FED. R. EVID. 501.  Rule 501 provides: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a 
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof 
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, 
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State 
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
determined in accordance with State law. 
Id. 
 328 See supra notes 142-199 and accompanying text. 
 329 See supra note 327. 
 330 SEC Review of Enforcement Remedies, Proposed Legislation on Administrative 
Proceedings, FOIA Privilege, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 456, 461 (Mar. 2, 1984). 
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therefor.331  Although the acceptance of selective waiver by the SEC 
would appear to lend credence to the doctrine’s value, the doctrine’s 
detractors have seized upon Congress’ failure to adopt the SEC 
proposal in an effort to support the argument against selective waiver. 
The Westinghouse court, in justifying its rejection of selective 
waiver, incorrectly noted that “Congress rejected an amendment to 
the [Exchange Act] . . . that would have established a selective waiver 
rule.”332  Congress, in fact, “did not reject the [SEC’s 1984] proposal; 
rather, the House Committee to which the proposal was submitted 
[merely] took no action.”333  Not only did the Third Circuit 
mischaracterize the nature of the alleged congressional “rejection” of 
selective waiver, but the court also erroneously afforded this 
circumstance meaning.334  Rather than constituting any form of 
persuasive authority, such “unsuccessful proposals to amend a law, in 
the years following its passage, carry no significance.”335  Although the 
Westinghouse court, as well as numerous commentators, have relied 
upon House Committee’s failure to act on the SEC proposal as 
constituting a reason to reject selective waiver,336 the fact “that the 
proposal before that House Committee in 1984 was not ultimately 
enacted carries no significance.”337 
Most recently, the SEC proposed a rule permitting selective 
waiver as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.338  Subsection 205.3(e)(3) 
read: “[w]here an issuer, through its attorney, shares with the [SEC] 
information related to a material violation, pursuant to a 
confidentiality agreement, such sharing of information shall not 
constitute a waiver of any otherwise applicable privilege or protection 
as to other persons.”339  The SEC, however, ultimately withdrew its 
proposal citing “the concern that some courts might not adopt the 
[SEC’s] analysis of [selective waiver], and that this could lead to 
adverse consequences for the attorneys and issuers who disclose 
information to the [SEC] pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, 
 
 331 Id. 
 332 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. 
 333 Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 n.116. 
 334 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. 
 335 NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 336 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. 
 337 Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 n.116 (citing Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 
299). 
 338 See id. 
 339 Id. 
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believing that the evidentiary protections accorded that information 
remain preserved.”340  In essence, the SEC feared that “attorneys 
might disclose information to the [SEC] in the belief that the 
evidentiary privileges for that information were preserved, only to 
have a court subsequently rule that the privilege was waived.”341 
The parameters of a rule embracing selective waiver require a 
legislative solution, as courts’ cool reception of the doctrine has 
prevented its widespread judicial adoption.342 General proscriptions 
against expanding our existing privileges have effectively caused 
courts to turn a blind eye to the public benefits afforded by a selective 
waiver rule.343  Courts, however, cannot be expected to weigh the 
large-scale competing interests at stake surrounding the decision to 
adopt a selective waiver rule.  The current political climate, only 
recently rocked by a swath of corporate scandals,344 renders the 
selective waiver issue sufficiently ripe for legislative action. 
C. Scope of the New Privilege 
An overall corporation-government privilege requires two 
important limitations.  First, the “privilege” should be qualified345, 
much like the work-product protection, such that a showing of 
substantial need or undue hardship would be sufficient to vitiate the 
protections of the privilege.346  While qualifying the privilege may 
serve to chill a corporation’s willingness to make disclosures to the 
government, the new privilege nevertheless renders cooperation with 
a government investigation more attractive than without the 
privilege.  Accounting for the potential that certain circumstances 
may require the privilege to yield to greater concerns renders the 
privilege flexible in situations where such flexibility is warranted.347  
Although the work-product protection may also be overcome in 
 
 340 Id. at 6312 n.117 
 341 Id. at 6312.  In support of its decision to withdraw its proposed selective waiver 
rule, the SEC cited a potential conflict with FED. R. EVID. 501.  Id.; see supra note 327 
and accompanying text.  Additionally, the SEC noted concern that “it was uncertain 
if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act granted the [SEC] the authority to promulgate a [selective 
waiver] rule.”  Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312. 
 342 See supra notes 142-199 and accompanying text. 
 343 Id. 
 344 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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extraordinary circumstances, attorneys continue to prepare 
documents and tangible things revealing trial strategy.348  Likewise, 
corporations will likely make disclosures to the government even 
though the new privilege protecting those disclosures is a qualified 
one. 
Additionally, recognition of the corporation-government 
privilege should be conditioned on the existence of a confidentiality 
agreement between the government agency and the disclosing 
corporation.  The confidentiality agreement makes certain that the 
government, in pursuit of the public interest, maintains control over 
whether the corporation-government privilege should attach to the 
disclosure.349  In so doing, the government agency can restrict the 
scope of the privilege, and ensure that the new privilege will only 
become applicable when, in the opinion of the government agency, 
the public interest in obtaining the disclosure outweighs other 
concerns.350 
CONCLUSION 
Although selective waiver does not advance the same values as 
attorney-client, work-product, and self-evaluative privileges351, it does 
advance other important public values.352  It serves to complement 
existing methods of curtailing corporate criminal activity.353 A 
qualified corporation-government privilege, conditioned upon a 
confidentiality agreement, will enhance cooperation with 
government investigations by corporations suspected of 
wrongdoing.354  This disclosure serves vital public interests by 
facilitating the prosecution of white-collar criminals, thus decreasing 
the likelihood of similar offenses occurring in the future.355  
Furthermore, this disclosure, facilitated by a new corporation-
government privilege, will enable the government to conduct cost-
 
 348 Id. 
 349 See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (observing that “[t]he SEC restricts its 
grants of confidentiality agreements to situations where it has reason to believe that 
obtaining work product is in the public interest and will result in greater efficiency in 
the investigation.”). 
 350 See id. 
 351 See supra notes 264-292 and accompanying text. 
 352 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text. 
 353 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text. 
 354 See supra notes 345-350 and accompanying text. 
 355 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text. 
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efficient investigations, resolve a higher quantity of investigations, 
and require cooperating corporations to institute internal controls to 
detect criminal wrongdoing within their midst.356 
Although a corporation-government privilege necessarily 
inhibits post-disclosure private litigant discovery efforts, the current 
regime, by granting private litigants access to corporate disclosures, 
fails to provide sufficient incentives to foster voluntary disclosures.357  
The existing post-disclosure discovery burden chills corporate 
cooperation with government investigations, thereby hindering law 
enforcement efforts.358  Corporations’ decreased willingness to make 
such disclosures also reduces the availability of disclosed materials 
currently discoverable by private litigants.359  The selective waiver 
doctrine, implemented in the form of a corporation-government 
privilege, therefore provides substantial benefits at low cost.360  The 
only significant burden associated with the new privilege is that it 
induces lawmakers and judges to abandon their fears of recognizing 
new privileges.361 
Opponents have hoped that selective waiver would fade into the 
annals of legal history, but the doctrine has survived in commentary 
and in certain courts because it provides the proper incentives for 
corporate cooperation with government investigations.  Congress 
should implement a selective waiver rule in the form of a new 
privilege in order to obtain voluntary disclosures necessary to combat 
criminal activity brewing within America’s corporations. 
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